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I. Introduction
The following is an update on Kansas legislative activity and case law
relating to oil, gas and mineral law from August 1, 2021, to July 31, 2022.
II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments
There have not been any significant Legislative or Regulatory
Developments affecting Kansas Oil and Gas Law from August 1, 2021, to
July 31, 2022.
III. Judicial Developments
A. Supreme Court Cases
1. L. Ruth Fawcett Trust v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas1
In L. Ruth Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas, the Supreme Court
of Kansas (“the Court”) held that Kansas mineral rights owners cannot
amend a class-action suit to relitigate facts conceded in prior proceedings in
an action seeking damages for alleged underpayment of natural gas
royalties.
The Kansas Supreme Court held that the royalty owner class failed to
justify departing from the “law of the case” doctrine, which bars
reconsideration of matters resolved in previous rulings.
a) Facts and Procedural History
This is the second appeal in a class action case alleging a breach of the
implied duty to market gas and underpaid royalties.
In 2011, the L. Ruth Fawcett Trust filed a class-action suit on behalf of
2,300 royalty owners (the “Class”) in Seward County, Kansas, alleging well
operator Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas (the “Operator”) had been
unlawfully deducting from royalty payments the cost to process raw gas for
downstream sale.2
The suit accused the Operator of breaching the marketable condition
rule, a corollary to the duty to reasonably market minerals which requires
well operators to use their own funds to process gas into a marketable
product.

1. L. Ruth Fawcett Trust v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas, 315 Kan. 259, 507 P.3d
1124 (2022).
2. Id.
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After the district court granted summary judgment to the Class, the
question of when gas reaches a marketable condition ended up before the
Kansas Supreme Court.
In Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas,3 302 Kan. 350 (2015)
(Fawcett I), the Supreme Court held that a well operator may satisfy its
duty to market raw gas production if the oil and gas leases provide that raw
gas may be sold at the wellhead, the gas is actually sold at the wellhead to a
third-party purchaser in a good faith transaction, and the gas is in a
condition acceptable to the third-party purchaser at the time of the sale.
The Court thereby held that the Operator properly deducted post-sale
processing costs from the royalties owed to the Class. The Supreme Court
noted that the leases at issue allowed wellhead sales and the Class did not
dispute the well Operator's good faith in executing the purchase
agreements.
That case was remanded to the district court.
On remand, the Class moved to amend the petition to clarify that the sole
claim in its original petition – breach of implied duty to market- now
implicated the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Asserting that
the Supreme Court had created a new requirement by incorporating a duty
of good faith into the marketable condition rule, the Class sought to amend
its suit to allege the Operator breached the duty by selling gas that required
further processing.
The Class argued that Fawcett I significantly altered the landscape of
Kansas oil and gas law by introducing the concept of an implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing, a factual question, into the marketability
determination.

3. Background facts: The original Fawcett case was a class action against an operator
of natural gas wells alleging breach of implied duty to market gas. The Class sought
recovery of underpaid royalties under 25 oil and gas leases entered into between 1944 and
1991, of which Oil Producers, Inc. was the lessee-operator. The royalty provisions in the
leases called for the royalty calculations to be made based on a sale of gas at the well or on
the market value at the well. Natural gas coming from the ground in its raw condition must
be processed before it is suitable for interstate pipelines. The Operator lacked the means to
independently process the raw natural gas and make it suitable for transport, so it entered
into third-party purchase agreements where the purchaser did the processing of the raw
natural gas. The expense of processing the raw natural gas was deducted from the purchase
price the third-party purchaser paid to the Operator. The Operator had been paying the class
of lessors’ royalties based on the sale price after deducting the expense of processing the raw
natural gas.
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The Operator opposed the motion to amend. It argued that Fawcett I
already resolved the marketable condition issue when it found that the
Operator satisfied its implied duty to market.
The district court sided with the Operator.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.
b) Analysis
Under Kansas law, all gas leases impose an implied duty on well
operators to market any minerals produced. To satisfy this duty, the
operator must market its production at reasonable terms within a reasonable
time following production.4
An effect of the duty to market is the marketable condition rule that
requires well operators to make gas marketable at their own expense,
meaning they cannot deduct the expenses to make gas marketable from
royalty payments to the landowners.5
In Fawcett I, the Court held that when a lease provides for royalties
based on a share of proceeds from the sale of gas at the well, and the gas is
sold at the well, the operator's duty to make gas marketable is satisfied
when the operator, through a good faith transaction, delivers the gas to the
purchaser in a condition acceptable to the purchaser.
Relying on the undisputed facts presented by the parties, the Court
further held that as a matter of law, the leases at issue did not impose on the
Operator the responsibility to perform the post-production, post-sale
gathering, compressing, dehydrating, treating, or processing that may be
necessary to convert the gas sold at the wellhead into gas capable of
transmission into interstate pipelines.
The Court discussed that the law of the case doctrine provides that when
a second trial or appeal is pursued in a case, the first decision is the settled
law of the case on all questions addressed in a first appeal and
reconsideration will not be given to such questions. The law of the case
doctrine is a creature of common law with limited exceptions, one of which
allows the court to deviate from the law of the case when a controlling
authority has made a contrary decision regarding the law applicable to the
issues.
Pre-Fawcett I caselaw makes clear that the implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing in oil and gas sales transactions is part and parcel of the
implied duty to market, which requires operators to market the gas on
4. Fawcett I, 302 Kan. at 352.
5. Id.
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reasonable terms as determined by what an experienced operator of
ordinary prudence would do, having due regard for the interests of both the
lessor and lessee.
Fawcett I did not change existing law by introducing for the first time an
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing into the marketable condition
component of the duty to market.
The Court pointed out that a court can deviate from the law-of-the-case
doctrine when the applicable law has changed.6 In the new appeal, the
Court rejected the Class's argument that the prior decision had changed the
law and for the first time imposed an implied good faith duty on the
marketable condition rule. Instead, the Court held that this duty has existed
for at least 45 years.
In the underlying case, despite existing case law and the Operator raising
the issue of their ability to challenge the prudence of the purchase contracts,
the Class chose not to question whether the contracts were unreasonable or
made in bad faith. The Court held that, “To allow the Class now to put facts
in dispute that it previously deemed admitted would give the Class an
impermissible second bite at the apple on the marketable condition question
when it was fully litigated in Fawcett I.”7
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court and appellate court. It held
that in Fawcett I, the Court held that under the leases at issue the Operator
satisfied its duty to market the gas when the gas was sold at the wellhead.
The Court went on to conclude that the law of the case doctrine precludes
the Class from now relitigating its claim that the Operator breached its
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing as alleged in the motion to
amend the petition.
c) Conclusion
The Supreme Court held that the Court’s opinion in the prior appeal did
not reflect a change of existing law that would allow for an exception to the
law of the case doctrine. That doctrine precludes the Class from relitigating
the claim that the Operator breached the implied duty to market. The Court
further held that the law of the case doctrine precluded the Class from
raising a good faith argument based on an intended market theory.

6. State v. Kleypas, 305 Kan. 224, 382 P.3d 373 (2016).
7. L. Ruth Fawcett Trust v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas, 315 Kan. 259, 282, 507 P.3d
1124 (2022).
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B. Appellate Activity
None reported.
C. Trial Activity
None reported.
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